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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner Casey was convicted by a jury of attempted murder (a second degree 
felony, aggravated assault (a third degree felony), and domestic violence in the 
presence of a child (a third degree felony). Direct appeal was made to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, which affirmed Casey's convictions. Casey then filed a petition for certiorari 
in this court, and the petition was granted. This court takes jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The sole issue subject to certiorari review is whether the Utah Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that even though State v. Vigil requires proof of a conscious objective 
or desire to kill, the crime of attempted murder can be committed with a "knowing" state 
of mind. This court reviews the interpretation of a statutory scheme for correctness, 
according no deference to a lower court's conclusions of law. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 
930, 937 (Utah 1998). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and 
"criminal negligence or criminally negligent. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire 
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to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101. Attempt-Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unles>s it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed 
had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Murder. [1996] 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
(d) [felonymurder]; 
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(e) [recklessly cause death of peace officer]. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
* * • * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As a result of an altercation with his girlfriend, Michael Shawn Casey was 
charged in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, with attempted murder, 
aggravated assault, and committing a domestic violence crime in the presence of a 
child. (R. 34) A jury convicted Casey on all three counts and the trial judge sentenced 
him to prison. (R. 189) After the judge imposed the sentence, Casey filed a motion to 
vacate his convictions arguing that the jury was improperly instructed on the mental 
state required for the crime of attempted murder. (R. 142) Specifically, Casey argued 
that under Utah law he could only be convicted of attempted murder if the state proved 
he acted intentionally. The jury, however, was instructed it could find that Casey acted 
intentionally or knowingly. (R. 95-96) The trial court decided the issue on the merits 
and denied the motion, ruling that the jury was properly instructed on the mental state 
required for an attempted murder conviction. (R. 193) 
Casey appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of Appeals raising several 
contentions of error regarding the attempted murder conviction and the aggravated 
assault conviction (R. 202; Appellant's Brief on Appeal); the court of appeals affirmed 
on all grounds. 
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Casey then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court on the sole issue that he 
was wrongly convicted of attempted murder since the jury instructions permitted the jury 
to find that Casey acted with an intentional or knowing state of mind. This Court 
granted the petition in an order dated September 26, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to trial testimony of the victim, Tresa Franz, on April 12, 1999, Franz 
and Casey were in the process of ending a months'-long sexual relationship. (Trial 
Transcript 134-35) [Hereinafter "Tr."] On that day, Franz, Casey, a man named Terron 
Allred, and Franz's four year old son Quincy drove to a friend's house in a Jeep Tracker 
to move Franz's truck. (Tr. 135-36) Casey and Franz sat in the front seat while Quincy 
and Terron sat in back. (Tr. 142) 
After the group moved the truck to a nearby school, they stopped at a liquor 
store and purchased a pint of rum. (Tr. 137, 310-11, 400) According to Franz, she and 
Terron each had a swig of alcohol from the bottle and Casey drank the rest. (Tr. 137, 
175-76,497-99) 
After the trip to the liquor store, the group drove to Tiffany Ribe's house near 
North Temple and 1500 West. (Tr. 142-44) Franz testified that when they arrived at 
the house, Casey got out of the Tracker and walked over to a group of girls. (Tr. 144-
45) When Casey returned to the truck, he told Terron to get out. (Tr. 145) Terron 
complied. As Casey got back into the truck, he reached behind the seat and grabbed 
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an object that he held next to his thigh. (Tr. 146, 177) According to Franz, she asked 
Casey if he was ready to go home. Casey responded, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm going to 
take you home all right." Casey then revealed a gun and put it to Franz's head or neck. 
(Tr. 146-47) 
Tiffany Ribe apparently observed what was taking place in the vehicle and ran 
from the back porch to the Tracker to tell Casey and the others to leave. (Tr. 147-49, 
197) 
As Casey put the gun down, Franz jumped out of the vehicle and ran into 
Tiffany's house. Casey ran into the house for Franz, and she ran back to the Tracker 
for Quincy. (R. 149) When Casey returned to the truck, he told Franz to get in. She 
did so. (Tr. 149-50) Terron also got back into the truck and Casey began to pull out of 
the driveway. (Tr. 150) 
At that point, Casey again put the gun to Franz's head. He pulled the trigger. 
Franz testified she heard a click but nothing happened. (Tr. 151, 153) Casey then 
pointed the gun down and fired a shot in the direction of Franz's feet. (Tr. 153) Again 
Casey pointed the gun at her head. (Tr. 154) According to Franz, she grabbed 
Casey's arm and pushed the gun into the air. She then jumped from the Tracker, which 
she claimed was traveling at 35 miles per hour. (Tr. 154, 208) 
However, Terron testified that after he got back in the car and the group was 
driving away, Casey pointed the gun in the air, pulled the trigger, and the gun misfired. 
(Tr. 316) Terron, who was sitting in the backseat, testified that he did not see Casey 
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point the gun at Franz's head. (Tr. 352) This testimony was contradicted, however, by 
the testimony of a police officer, who stated that during an interview with Terron the 
night of the incident Terron reported that Casey put the gun to Franz's head and she 
moved it away. (Tr. 389) Terron did not tell the officer that Casey put the gun to 
Franz's head and the gun misfired. Casey testified that the gun misfired when he 
pointed it in the air. (Tr. 477) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Casey's conviction for attempted murder, 
holding that the jury was properly instructed that it could find Casey guilty if he acted 
"intentionally" or "knowingly". This instruction was erroneous. Under Utah Law, and the 
holding in State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), in an attempted murder case the 
prosecution must prove that the accused acted with the conscious objective or desire to 
kill, language which tracks the definition of "intentionally" in the Utah Code. This is a 
higher standard than the "knowingly" standard that the jury was permitted to consider. 
Accordingly, Casey was wrongfully convicted of attempted murder, and the case must 
be remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding that even though State v. Vigil 
requires proof of a conscious objective or desire to kill, the crime of 
attempted murder can be committed with a "knowing" state of mind. 
On direct appeal, Casey argued that the jury was improperly instructed on the 
crime of attempted murder because the jury was permitted to find that the offense was 
committed intentionally or knowingly when instead the jury should have been instructed 
that the state needed to prove that Casey acted with a conscious objective or desire to 
cause death. However, on appeal the Utah Court of Appeals rejected Casey's 
argument and held that the jury was properly instructed because attempted murder can 
be committed either intentionally or knowingly. 
The dispositive case in this appeal is State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), 
which clearly identifies the mental state required to prove attempted murder: a 
conscious objective or desire to cause death. Casey now requests this Court to 
reaffirm its earlier statement in Vigil that, based on its interpretation of Utah's attempt 
statute, attempted murder is a specific intent crime and that a knowing state of mind is 
insufficient to support a conviction. 
The analysis of this issue begins with State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 
1982). In Maestas, this Court rejected an attempt to graft a common law mens rea 
standard to Utah's statutory mens rea requirement for attempted murder. Although the 
Maestas court was not asked to address the precise issue of the difference between an 
intentional or knowing attempted murder, it is nevertheless true the court concluded that 
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"[t]he instructions to the jury correctly described the elements of attempted first degree 
murder and defined the terms Intentionally' and 'knowingly' in precisely the language 
used by the Utah Criminal Code." j d at 907. The opinion also stressed "there can be 
no difference between the intent required as an element of the crime of attempted first 
degree murder and that required for first degree murder itself." Id, at 904. 
Ten years later, however, this Court flatly rejected its earlier pronouncement that 
there is no difference in the intent requirements for murder and attempted murder.1 
State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), refined and amplified the earlier reasoning of 
Maestas and gave a more thorough interpretation to Utah's attempt statute in 
conjunction with the murder statute. Although Vigil involved a challenge to a conviction 
for attempted depraved indifference murder, this Court set forth the standard that 
applies to any attempted murder case: 
We hold that to convict a defendant of attempted second degree murder, 
the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a conscious objective 
or desire to cause the death of another. Because the mental state 
required for depraved indifference homicide falls short of that intent, the 
crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide does not exist in 
1
 Development of the law in Utah was already headed in this direction. In 1989 
this Court noted that other states with attempt statutes similar to Utah's required a 
specific intent to kill as the required mental state for attempted murder. State v. 
BellJ85 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989). At issue in Bell, however, was the validity of the 
crime of attempted felony murder, so the opinion did not specifically address the issue 
now before this Court. However, a footnote in the case, id at 393 n.13, cites a long list 
of cases supporting the proposition argued in this appeal, to wit, that attempted murder 
requires a specific intent to kill. 
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Utah.2 
i d at 848. 
To reach that result this Court concluded: "We believe that the most reasonable 
approach, in light of the statutory language and our cases, is to read the word 'intent' in 
paragraph (2) of the attempt statute [Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101] as that word is 
defined in section 76-2-103(1 )."3 \jL The Court noted that as a matter of statutory 
construction it is normally presumed "that when the legislature defines a term of art and 
later uses that term in the same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning." kL 
Under section 76-2-103(1), a person engages in conduct "[intentionally, or with 
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
2
 In the opinion by the court of appeals in this case, the court quoted this entire 
passage. What the court of appeals did not do, however, is point out that the mental 
state for a knowing homicide also falls short of the legal standard described in the first 
sentence of the passage. The statutory definition of "intentionally" with respect to a 
defendant's state of mind is not the equivalent of the definition of "knowingly." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) and (2). 
3
 The attempt statute reads in pertinent part: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (emphasis added). 
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when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result." In contrast, under section 76-2-103(2), a person engages in conduct 
"[kjnowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result." The Court reasoned that "the word Intent' as used in paragraph (2) of the 
attempt statute should be read to mean 'conscious objective or desire.' This meaning 
of the word Intent' obviously is distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed 
conduct or result, which is the mental state required for depraved indifference 
homicide." jd, at 847 (emphasis added). Thus the plain language of the Vigil holding 
dictates that knowledge is insufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. 
In analyzing the statutory construction issue, the Vigil court cited the 
commentaries of the Model Penal Code and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 
observing: "the commentaries make clear that both the MPC and PFCC attempt 
provisions require a more culpable mental state than recklessness for conduct that 
creates the substantial step. The PFCC attempt provision requires intentional conduct 
. . . and the MPC attempt provision requires either intentional conduct or the belief that 
the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act." 842 P.2d at 846-47 (citations 
omitted). By requiring proof of a conscious objective or desire to kill, the Court in Vigil 
interpreted Utah's attempt statute consistent with the PFCC provision, requiring 
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intentional conduct. The Vigil holding, by its plain terms, does not adopt the MPC 
approach which in fact permits proof of a state of mind closely resembling Utah's 
statutory definition of "knowingly." 
The Vigil approach, making attempted murder a specific intent crime, reflects the 
great weight of authority. As Professor LaFave has noted: "Under the approach 
generally taken in the modern codes, 'intent' is narrowly defined to distinguish it from 
'knowledge.' See § 3.5(a). This means the knowledge mental state, though proper for 
the crime of murder, should not be used in attempt murder jury instructions." Wayne R. 
LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.2(c)(1) at 541 n.73 (3rd ed. 2000).4 Professor LaFave also 
observes that most modern codes (like Utah's) have not adopted the attempt provision 
drafted by the authors of the Model Penal Code. k i at 542 n.84; see also State v. 
Debarros, 755 A.2d 303, 309 (Conn. Ct. App. 2000) (to act intentionally, as is required 
for attempted murder conviction, accused must have had a conscious objective to 
cause death); Commonwealth v. Spells, 612 A.2d 458, 460 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1992) 
(specific intent necessary to support conviction for attempted murder); Austin v. State, 
600 A.2d 1142, 1145 (Md. Ct. App. 1992) (person can be convicted of attempted 
murder only where there is a specific and actual intent to kill); Haywood v. 
Commonwealth, 458 S.E.2d 606, 607 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (person cannot be guilty of 
attempted murder unless he had a specific intent to kill); State v. Coble, 527 S.E.2d 45, 
4
 "Although murder may be committed without an intent to kill, attempt to commit 
murder requires a specific intent to kill." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 
743 (14th ed. 1981); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 351 (1991). 
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47 (N.C. 2000) (same); State v. Williams. 670 So. 2d 414, 416 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 
(same); Minter v. State. 653 N.E.2d 1382, 1383 (Ind. 1995) (same); People v. Hill. 658 
N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (III Ct. App. 1995) (same); State v. Kimbrouah. 924 S.W.2d 888, 
891 (Tenn. 1996) (same); Ochoa v. State. 981 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Nevada 1999) (intent 
to kill a human being is an essential element of attempted murder); State v. Buckley. 
953 P.2d 604, 605-07 (Idaho 1998) (attempted murder conviction reversed where jury 
instructions did not explain that prosecution had to prove intent to kill); McCurrv v. 
State. 763 So.2d 989, 991 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (attempted murder requires 
perpetrator to act with specific intent to commit murder; general felonious intent is not 
sufficient); 
Notwithstanding the holding in Vigil that to support a charge of attempted murder 
the state must prove a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another, the 
Court dropped a footnote stating in dictum that "Maestas is still good law insofar as it 
authorizes prosecution for. . . attempted murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-203(1 )(a)." |dL at 848 n.5. This language constitutes the 
crux of the court of appeals' decision, but simply cannot be reconciled with the actual 
holding in Vigil.5 The binding legal principle articulated in Vigil is not the dicta found in 
5
 Indeed, as stated above, had this Court actually intended to make a knowing 
state of mind sufficient for an attempted murder conviction, an analysis much closer to 
the MPC approach would have been adopted. Because this Court made a more 
limiting interpretation of Utah's statutory scheme, and thereby required an intentional 
state of mind for attempted murder, one must conclude that footnote 5 is in fact dicta, 
that it cannot be reconciled with the holding in the case, and therefore was not binding 
precedent on the court of appeals. 
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footnote 5, which is absolutely contrary to the holding in that case. In other words, if 
attempted murder can be accomplished knowingly, as suggested in footnote 5, then a 
jury cannot be properly instructed on the mens rea element of the offense if, as the 
holding in Vigil requires, the state must prove a conscious objective or desire to cause 
death. In practical terms, and as pointed out in the petition for certiorari, a trial court 
putting together jury instructions in an attempted murder case would be faced with the 
possibility of two utterly conflicting instructions on the required mental state, yet each 
statement of the law has justification in language found in the Vigil opinion. The first 
hypothetical instruction would read as follows: 
You are instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of 
attempted murder you must conclude that he acted intentionally or 
knowingly. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5. 
This instruction would then be preceded or followed by another instruction providing the 
statutory definitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly." And yet the trial judge in the 
hypothetical attempted murder case would also be presented with this jury instruction, 
with language lifted straight out of the holding in Vigil: 
You are instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of 
attempted murder you must conclude that he had a conscious objective or 
desire to cause the death of another person. Vigil 842 P.2d at 848. 
Arguably, Vigil provides legal authority in support of either instruction. However, as 
Casey argued in the court of appeals, the language in Vigil supporting a broader 
interpretation of the statute, one that would include "knowingly" as a correct formulation 
of the crime of attempted murder, was part of a footnote in the opinion and not part of 
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the actual holding. In Vigil this Court examined the state of mind necessary for an 
attempted murder conviction. While the posture of the case was a challenge to a 
conviction for attempted depraved indifference murder, the crux of the analysis (and the 
legal underpinnings of the decision) was the interpretation of the attempt statute in 
attempted murder cases. Vigil explained that a conviction must be based on proof of a 
conscious objective or desire to kill, and that the mental element required for depraved 
indifference murder did not meet this test. 
Similarly, in this case the court of appeals held that proof that a person acted 
knowingly will satisfy the mental element of attempted murder, even though "knowingly," 
as it is defined under section 76-2-103(2), clearly does not mean the same thing as "a 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result," which is the 
language defining "intentionally" under section 76-2-103(1). 
Different sentences in Vigil would seem to lead to opposite results. However, the 
central principle of Vigil is not the conflicting statement in footnote 5, but rather the 
Court's interpretation of Utah's attempt statute, which requires that the word "intent" in 
section 76-4-101(2) be given the same meaning as the definition provided for 
"intentionally" under section 76-2-103(1). The interpretive inconsistency must surrender 
to the core holding in Vigil that an attempted murder conviction must be based upon a 
conscious objective or desire to cause death. If footnote 5 in Vigil is good law, then it 
only follows that the holding which requires a conscious objective or desire to kill is, as 
a practical matter, of small legal significance since a knowing state of mind describes 
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something quite different than a conscious objective or desire to cause a specific result. 
Casey contends that footnote 5 is dicta, and should have had no precedential value in 
the determination of this issue by the court of appeals. The fact is that in Vigil this 
Court was not presented with the specific issue of whether attempted murder can be 
accomplished with a knowing state of mind. What the opinion in Vigil did do, however, 
was fix an exact standard, in precise language lifted verbatim from section 76-2-103(1), 
for the mental state required for attempted murder. That language cannot be 
reconciled with footnote 5 and the language defining "knowingly" in section 76-2-103(2). 
Accordingly, the jury was improperly instructed on the count of attempted murder 
since the instructions permitted an alternative finding of guilt that the crime was 
accomplished with a "knowing" state of mind. This result, and the decision of the court 
of appeals affirming the attempted murder conviction, is incompatible with the actual 
holding (as opposed to footnote 5) in Vigil. This Court should now hold that, consistent 
with Vigil and the plain meaning of Utah's attempt statute, a person must act with a 
conscious objective or desire to kill in order to be found guilty of attempted murder; a 
person cannot be convicted of that crime if the evidence demonstrates only that he 
acted knowingly. 
Finally, because of the serious risk of a patchwork jury verdict in this case, where 
some jurors might have found that Casey acted intentionally and others that he acted 
knowingly, this matter must be remanded to the district court for a new trial. See State 
v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Casey requests this Court to 
reverse his conviction for attempted murder and remand the case to the district court for 
a new trial. 
DATED this d^>
 d a y 0f / \ 0 1 / , 2001. 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA 
Lawyer for Appellant 
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Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Anne 
Stirba, J., of attempted murder and aggra-
vated assault, and he appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held that required men-
tal state for attempted murder under statute, 
providing that criminal homicide constitutes 
murder if a defendant intentionally or know-
ingly causes the death of another, is "intent 
or knowledge." 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <S=>1158(1) 
Statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law, and therefore, appellate 
court reviews the trial court's rulings inter-
preting statutes for correctness and gives no 
deference to its conclusions. 
2. Criminal Law <3=>29(14) 
Aggravated assault and attempted mur-
der were not necessary to each other and 
were separated by time, place, and interven-
ing circumstances, and thus, statute provid-
ing that, when same act of defendant estab-
lishes offenses which may be punished under 
different provisions, the act shall be punisha-
ble under only one such provision did not bar 
defendant's conviction of both offenses; ag-
gravated assault occurred in driveway when 
defendant pointed gun at victim, and as he 
drove, he committed separate act of attempt-
ed murder by pointing gun and pulling trig-
ger. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-402(1). 
3. Criminal Law <3=>795(1.5) 
Instruction stating that separate crime 
or offense is charged in each count of the 
information and each charge and evidence 
pertaining to it should be considered sepa-
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rately sufficiently instructed the jury that it 
could not convict defendant of aggravated 
assault and attempted murder based on the 
same evidence. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>1038.1(2) 
Absent a showing of manifest injustice, 
appellate court will refuse to review jury 
instructions to which party did not object in 
the trial court, and manifest injustice re-
quires that the error be obvious and be of 
sufficient magnitude that it affects the sub-
stantial rights of a party. Rules Crim.Proc, 
Rule 19(c). 
5. Criminal Law ®=>1038.1(3.1) 
Defendant's claim that the statutory ele-
ments, jury instructions, and evidence estab-
lished that the aggravated assault was a less-
er included offense of the attempted murder 
was not preserved for appeal since there was 
no evidence in the record that defendant 
objected to the jury instructions at trial or in 
his motion for a new trial and since defen-
dant did not argue on appeal that the error 
was obvious and of sufficient magnitude so as 
to constitute manifest injustice. Rules Crim. 
Proc, Rule 19(c). 
6. Homicide <3=>25 
Required mental state for attempted 
murder under statute, providing that crimi-
nal homicide constitutes murder if a defen-
dant intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another, is "intent or knowledge." 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-203(l)(a). 
Michael R. Sikora, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and 
Jeffrey S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, P.J. and 
BILLINGS, and DAVIS, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
111 Defendant Michael Shawn Casey ap-
peals his convictions of attempted murder, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
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Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(l)(a) and 76-4-101 
(1999), and aggravated assault, a third de-
gree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1999).1 Defendant argues he 
was improperly convicted of attempted mur-
der because the jury was not instructed that 
attempted murder requires the "intent" to 
cause a death. He also argues he was im-
properly convicted of aggravated assault and 
attempted murder because the offenses were 
based on the same conduct. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
U 2 " We view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict and recite them 
accordingly.'" State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 
123,112, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 24 P.3d 993 
(citation omitted). In early 1999, Defendant 
was romantically involved with Tresa Franz 
(Franz). After drinking alcohol with Terron 
Allred (Allred) and Franz, Defendant drove 
Allred, Franz, and Franz's son around. 
They eventually stopped to purchase a pint 
of rum. Defendant drank most of the pint 
and became intoxicated and belligerent to-
wards Franz. Franz asked Defendant to 
take her home, but he instead threatened to 
kill her and drove to a friend's house. At the 
house, Allred left the car to speak with the 
friend. Defendant and Franz began arguing, 
and Franz asked if he was ready to go home. 
Defendant responded, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm 
going to take you home all right," and point-
ed a handgun at Franz's neck. 
113 Seeing Defendant point the gun at 
Franz, the friend told them to leave. Defen-
dant put the gun down and agreed to leave. 
As Allred returned to the car, Franz fled into 
the house. However, she returned a few 
minutes later because she realized her son 
was not with her. After Franz returned, 
Defendant began arguing with her and 
1. Defendant was also convicted of domestic vio-
lence in the presence of a child, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109.1 (1999), and received enhanced penalties 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999), for 
use of a dangerous weapon. He does not appeal 
the conviction or the enhancements. 
2. The State does not argue that we should not 
consider the mens rea or lesser included offense 
issues because they were not preserved for ap-
peal. However, Defendant did not raise these 
threatened her again. Hearing the argu-
ment, the friend's uncle emerged from the 
house and told them to leave. Defendant 
apologized, backed out of the driveway, and 
drove away. 
114 Before they reached the end of the 
block, Defendant pointed the gun at Franz's 
face and pulled the trigger, but the gun 
misfired. Defendant then shot at Franz's 
feet, but missed, the bullet lodging in the 
floorboard. Defendant then pushed the gun 
barrel to Franz's head, but before he could 
pull the trigger, Franz pushed his arm in the 
air and jumped from the car. As she 
jumped, the gun discharged again. During 
the altercation, three shots were successfully 
fired. 
1f 5 Defendant was charged with attempted 
murder, aggravated assault, domestic vio-
lence in the presence of a child, and en-
hanced penalties on each count for using a 
dangerous weapon. The jury convicted De-
fendant on all counts. Prior to sentencing, 
Defendant's counsel withdrew. Subsequent-
ly, appointed counsel filed a motion for a new 
trial, arguing that the trial court improperly 
instructed the jury on the mens rea required 
for attempted murder and that the aggravat-
ed assault was a lesser included offense of 
the attempted murder. Following a hearing, 
the trial court denied Defendant's motion. 
Defendant filed this appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] 116 This appeal presents issues of 
statutory interpretation. Statutory interpre-
tation presents a question of law; "[there-
fore, we review the trial court's ruling[s] for 
correctness and give no deference to its con-
clusions." State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843, 844 
(Utah 1992); see also State v. Keppler, 1999 
UT App 89,114, 976 P.2d 99.2 
issues until his motion for a new trial. Ordinari-
ly the failure to timely raise an issue waives that 
issue. See Utah R.Crim. P. 12(d). However, 
when a trial court considers the merits of an 
issue raised in a motion for a new trial, the issue 
is preserved for appeal. See State v. Seale, 853 
P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (concluding objection 
to admission of videotape due to failure to com-
ply with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 was pre-
served for appeal because trial court addressed 
merits); State y. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 2 n. 3 (Utah 
STATE v. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Was Defendant Properly Convicted of 
Attempting to "Intentionally or Know-
ingly" Cause Franz's Death? 
11 7 Defendant argues that Utah's Criminal 
Code requires the State to prove that he had 
the "intent" to cause Franz's death. There-
fore, he argues the jury wTas improperly in-
structed that the required mental state was 
"intentionally or knowingly" and his convic-
tion must be reversed. 
11 8 The attempt statute provides: 
(1) [A] person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if, acting with the kind 
of culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he [or 
she] engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of 
the offense. 
(2) [C]onduct does not constitute a sub-
stantial step unless it is strongly corro-
borative of the actor's intent to commit 
the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). Defen-
dant was charged with attempted murder 
under section 76-5-203(1 )(a) of the murder 
statute (the "intentional or knowing" alterna-
tive). This section provides: "Criminal 
homicide constitutes murder if [a defendant] 
. . . intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(l)(a) (1999). 
11,9 Both parties rely on State v. Maestas, 
652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) and State v. Vigil 
842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992). Construing the 
attempt and murder statutes in Maestas, the 
Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that an 
attempt to commit first degree murder3 re : 
Ct.App.1993) (concluding objection to supple-
mental jury instruction was preserved for appeal 
because trial court considered and ruled on mer-
its). Although Defendant did not raise either 
issue until his motion for a new trial, the trial 
court considered and ruled on the merits of these 
issues. Therefore, we conclude the issues were 
preserved for appeal. 
3. In 1991 the Legislature changed "first degree 
murder" to "aggravated murder" and "second 
degree murder" to "murder." Act of 1991, ch. 
10, §§ 8-9, 1991 Utah Laws 74, 78-79 (codified 
as amended Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 to -
203 (1999)). The "intentional or knowing" men-
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quires a mental state greater than "know-
ing." See Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904-05. The 
court offered two rationales for its decision. 
First, the court interpreted paragraph one of 
the attempt statute to require "only the kind 
of culpability otherwise required for the com-
mission of the [completed] offense." Id. at 
904 (alteration in original) (quotations omit-
ted). Accordingly, the court concluded that 
"there [is] no difference between the intent 
required as an element of the crime of at-
tempted first degree murder and that re-
quired for first degree murder." Id. Alter-
natively, the court explained, even if the 
common law governed, the "intentional or 
knowing" mental state required for first de-
gree murder was sufficient under the com-
mon law. See id. at 905. 
1110 Significantly, the jury instructions in 
Maestas were similar to the jury instructions 
in the present case. They "described the 
elements of attempted first degree murder 
and defined the terms 'intentionally' and 
'knowingly' in precisely the language used by 
the Utah Criminal Code." Id. at 907 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(l)-(2) (1953)). 
The Maestas court specifically noted that the 
jury "received proper instruction[s] concern-
ing the act and intent requirements for the 
crime charged." Id. 
1111 Subsequently, in Vigil, the Utah Su-
preme Court held that attempted murder 
under the depraved indifference murder al-
ternative in section 76-5-203(1 )(c)4 is not a 
crime. See Vigil, 842 P.2d at 843-44. The 
court first noted the mental state required to 
support a depraved indifference murder con-
viction is "knowledge" that conduct "created 
a grave risk of death to another." Id. at 844. 
The court then rejected the Maestas court's 
tal states required for aggravated murder in sec-
tion 76-5-202(1) and murder in section 76-5-
203(1 )(a) are identical. See State v. Johnson, 821 
P.2d 1150, 1160 n. 6 (Utah 1991). Aggravated 
murder requires aggravating circumstances to 
accompany the mental state. See id. at 1156. 
4. "Criminal homicide constitutes murder if [the 
defendant] . .. acting under circumstances evi-
dencing a depraved indifference to human life 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby causes the death of 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(c) 
(1999). 
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interpretation of paragraph one of the at-
tempt statute. Paragraph one provides that 
an attempt occurs when a defendant "acts 
with the 'kind of culpability otherwise re-
quired' " for the underlying offense. Id. at 
845 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)). 
The court construed that language "to refer 
to the attendant circumstances, if any, of the 
underlying offense." Id. at 845-46 (footnote 
omitted). 
1112 The court then construed paragraph 
two of the attempt statute. Paragraph two 
provides that "the defendant's conduct must 
be corroborative of his or her 'intent to com-
mit the offense.'" Id. at 845 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2)). The court con-
cluded paragraph two limits attempts to of-
fenses with the mental state of "intent," as 
defined by section 76-2-103(1). See id. at 
847. Section 76-2-103(1) defines "intent" as 
" 'conscious objective or desire.' " Id. (em-
phasis and citation omitted). Accordingly, 
the court held: 
[T]o convict a defendant of attempted sec-
ond degree murder, the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant had a conscious 
objective or desire to cause the death of 
another. Because the mental state re-
quired for depraved indifference homicide 
falls short of that intent, the crime of 
attempted depraved indifference homicide 
does not exist in Utah. 
Id. at 848 (emphasis added). 
1113 Although in Vigil the court overruled 
Maestas in part, the court expUcitly refused 
to completely overrule Maestas and approved 
the second rationale articulated in Maestas. 
The first alternative rationale relied on in 
Maestas is clearly inconsistent with . . . 
[State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), 
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), 
and State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1978) ] and with our holding in the instant 
case. Thus, that portion of Maestas . . . is 
5. Following Vigil, Utah appellate courts have 
stated without analysis that the mental state re-
quired for an attempted murder conviction under 
the "intentional or knowing" alternative is "in-
tent" to cause a death or "knowledge that one's 
acts would result in death if carried out" State v. 
Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 642 (Utah 1997) (plurali-
ty opinion), or knowledge that "conduct [is] rea-
sonably certain to cause [a] death." State v. 
incorrect. However, we note that Maestas 
is still good law insofar as it authorizes 
prosecution for attempted aggravated 
murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or at-
tempted murder under the intentional or 
knowing formulation of section 76-5-
203(1) (a). 
Id. at 848 n. 5. (emphasis added). Thus, 
Vigil explicitly allows a conviction for a 
"knowing" mental state under § 76-5-
203(l)(a), which is the section under which 
Defendant was convicted. 
f 14 Defendant argues that following Vigil, 
attempted murder requires the "intent" to 
cause a death, therefore, the "knowing" state 
of mind in the "intentional or knowing" alter-
native is insufficient. We disagree. The 
court noted, "The issue before us is narrowf,-] 
. . . to determine whether . . . the 'knowing* 
mental state required for depraved indiffer-
ence homicide under section 76-5-203(l)(c) 
. . . is sufficient to satisfy the mental state 
required by Utah's attempt statute." Id. at 
844. If the court intended to eliminate at-
tempted "knowing" murders under the "in-
tentional or knowing" alternative, instead of 
writing that uMaestas is still good law insofar 
as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempt-
ed murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-203(l)(a)," id. at 
848 n. 5 (emphasis added), the court could 
have simply written that Maestas is still good 
law insofar as it authorizes attempted "inten-
tional" murders under section 76-5-
203(l)(a).5 
II. Was Defendant Properly Convicted of 
Aggravated Assault and Attempted 
Murder? 
1115 Defendant argues that the aggravated 
assault and attempted murder should not 
have been charged as two separate offenses 
because they were one offense in the same 
White, 880 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah Ct.App.1994); see 
also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 n. 3 
(Utah Ct.App.1992) (noting required mental state 
is "intent" or "knowledge"); cf. State v. John-
son, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1991) (noting 
prior to Vigil mental state required is "intent" or 
"knowledge"); State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 
1323, 1325 (Utah 1983) (same). 
STATE v. 
Cite as 29 P.3d 25 
criminal episode and because the aggravated 
assault was a lesser included offense of the 
attempted murder. Under section 76-1-
402(1): 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall estab-
lish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions 
of this code, the act shall be punishable 
under only one such provision.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999). 
f 16 The clear intent of this section is that 
"[a] defendant may not be punished twice for 
[the same] act." State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 
896, 900 (Utah 1986). Thus, we must deter-
mine if the conduct supporting the aggravat-
ed assault and attempted murder were the 
"same act." See State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 
63 (Utah CtApp.1989). 
1117 Utah appellate courts have concluded 
acts are independent if they are in no way 
necessary to each other or sufficiently sepa-
rated by time and place. See State v. Young, 
780 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Utah 1989) (concluding 
forcible sexual abuse and forcible sodomy 
supported two counts of aggravated sexual 
assault because they were in no way neces-
sary to each other); O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 897, 
900 (concluding defendants who broke into 
cabin, then later pointed guns at owners, 
threatened to shoot them, held them at gun 
point for several hours, took money from 
them, and then kidnaped them, were proper-
ly sentenced for aggravated burglary, aggra-
vated robbery, and aggravated kidnaping be-
cause the crimes were the result of separate 
and distinct acts); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 
1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (concluding defendant 
committed two separately punishable burgla-
ries when he broke into an apartment within 
twenty minutes of breaking into a laundry-
room in the same "apartment house"). 
[2] 1118 We conclude the aggravated as-
sault and attempted murder were not neces-
sary to each other and were separated by 
time, place, and intervening circumstances. 
The aggravated assault occurred in the 
driveway. Defendant stated, "Fuck you, 
bitch. I'm going to take you home all right," 
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then pointed a gun at Franz's neck. Seeing 
Defendant point the gun at Franz, the friend 
told him to leave and he put the gun down. 
Franz then fled the car into the house. 
Clearly, the assault was complete at this 
point. 
1119 Following the assault, Franz remained 
in the house for a few minutes. Franz then 
returned to the car, and Defendant began 
arguing with her again. The friend's uncle 
emerged from the house and told them to 
leave. Defendant then backed the car out of 
the driveway. As Defendant drove down the 
street, he committed the separate act of at-
tempting to murder Franz by pointing a gun 
at her head and pulling the trigger. He then 
shot at her feet and pushed the gun barrel to 
her head. 
1120 Clearly, the aggravated assault and 
attempted murder were in no way necessary 
to each other and were separated by time, 
place, and intervening circumstances. Thus, 
we conclude section 76-1-402(1) does not bar 
Defendants conviction of both offenses. 
1121 Defendant next argues that the statu-
tory elements, jury instructions, and evi-
dence establish that the aggravated assault 
was a lesser included offense of the attempt-
ed murder. He therefore argues he was 
improperly convicted of both offenses under 
section 76-1-402(3): 
A defendant may be convicted of an of-
fense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An of-
fense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (em-
phasis added). 
1122 The State concedes, and we assume 
without deciding, that Defendant's conduct 
while driving involved an aggravated assault 
which merged into an attempted murder. 
However, the issue in this case is not wheth-
er Defendant was improperly convicted of a 
lesser included offense based on his conduct 
while driving. Rather, the issue is whether 
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the assault on Franz in the driveway followed 
by the attempted murder while driving down 
the street were separately proved at trial. 
1123 In State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998), this court considered whether 
aggravated assault was a lesser included of-
fense of aggravated burglary. See id. at 617. 
The evidence demonstrated three separate 
assaults had occurred, two in the victim's 
house and one in the defendant's car. See id. 
at 619. We noted, "While it is true that [the] 
defendant twice assaulted [the victim] during 
the aggravated burglary, he assaulted her a 
third time after he left the scene of the 
burglary and was in the act of committing 
aggravated kidnaping." Id. Therefore, we 
concluded, "[T]he elements of aggravated as-
sault were established by proof of more than 
'all the facts required to establish' the aggra-
vated burglary." Id. (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (1995)). We then con-
sidered "whether the jury was properly in-
structed to find this additional proof." Id. 
We concluded that because the jury was 
instructed that it had to find an additional 
element to convict the defendant of aggravat-
ed assault, that the defendant intentionally 
caused serious bodily injury, under the facts 
of the case, aggravated assault was not a 
lesser included offense of aggravated burgla-
ry. See id. 
1f 24 Unlike Betha, the aggravated assault 
in the present case has the same elements as 
the attempted murder, but was based on 
different facts. However, Betha counsels 
that a jury must be instructed appropriately 
so it does not convict a defendant twice on 
the same facts. See id. To uphold Defen-
dant's conviction, we must find that a reason-
able jury would have understood that based 
on the instructions, arguments, and evidence 
at trial, it could not convict Defendant of 
6. The State's arguments make it clear that the 
aggravated assault and attempted murder were 
based on separate conduct. In her opening ar-
gument the prosecutor stated: 
[Defendant has] been charged with three 
crimes. He's been charged with aggravated 
assault. And that's for pointing a gun at 
[Franz's] head while they were parked behind 
[the friend's] house. He's been charged with 
attempted homicide. And that's for pointing a 
gun at [Franz], pulling the trigger and trying to 
kill her. 
aggravated assault and attempted murder 
based only on the acts in the driveway or 
only on the acts committed while driving 
down the street. Cf State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 
236, 245 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 
[3] 1125 Defendant argues the jury was 
not instructed that it could not convict Defen-
dant of aggravated assaulted and attempted 
murder based on the conduct while driving. 
However, the jury was instructed that "[a] 
separate crime or offense is charged in each 
count of the information. Each charge and 
the evidence pertaining to it should be con-
sidered separately." (Emphasis added.) 
[4,5] 1126 Arguably this instruction suffi-
ciently instructed the jury that it could not 
convict Defendant of aggravated assault and 
attempted murder based on the same evi-
dence.6 Moreover, there is no evidence in 
the record that Defendant objected to the 
jury instructions at trial or in his motion for 
a new trial. "[R]ule 19(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure provides that in order 
to preserve an issue involving a jury instruc-
tion, the objecting party must make an objec-
tion in the trial court, 'stating distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the ground of 
his objection.'" State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 
1221, 1227 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah 
R.Crim. .P. 19(c)). "Accordingly, absent a 
showing of manifest injustice, . . . [we will] 
refuse to review jury instructions to which 
[a] party did not object in the trial 
court " Id. Manifest injustice requires 
that the error be "obvious" and "be of suffi-
cient magnitude that it affects the substantial 
rights of a party." Id. at 1226 (quotations 
and citation omitted). Defendant does not 
argue on appeal that the instructions meet 
either of these requirements. Therefore, his 
lesser included offense argument fails. 
In closing, the prosecutor stated: 
Going in chronological order . . . first of all, 
[Defendant has been] charged with aggravated 
assault . . . . And I submit to you that when 
[Defendant] was at [the friend's] house, he 
pointed a gun at [Franz] . . . threatening her 
with a dangerous weapon. That is an aggra-
vated assault. The attempted homicide, Count 
1. And [Defendant] took that gun and he point-
ed it at [Franz's] head in the car and he pulled 
the trigger. [Defendant] attempted to kill . . . 
[Franz]. 
STATE EX 
Cite as 29 P.3d 31 
CONCLUSION 
[6] 1127 We conclude that the required 
mental state for attempted murder under 
section 76-5-203(l)(a) is "intent or knowl-
edge," and therefore, the jury was appropri-
ately instructed in the present case. We also 
conclude that Defendant's aggravated assault 
and attempted murder convictions were 
based on independent acts and were sepa-
rately proven at trial. Therefore, we affirm 
Defendant's convictions. 
1128 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and 
JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
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STATE of Utah, in the interest of A.E., 
D.E., C.E., and S.E., persons under 
eighteen years of age. 
M.E., Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, Appellee. 
No. 20000325-CA. 
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June 28, 2001. 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 9, 2001. 
Father appealed from judgment of the 
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden De-
partment, L. Kent Bachman, J., terminating 
his parental rights. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, J., held that father waived his statu-
tory right to counsel. 
Affirmed. 
1. Infants <3=>251, 252 
Appellate court reviews a waiver of stat-
utory right to counsel in termination of pa-
rental rights case for correctness, but grants 
trial court reasonable measure of discretion 
REL. A.E. Utah 31 
(UtahApp. 2001) 
when applying law to the facts. U.C.A.1953, 
78-3a-913(l)(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>840(3) 
Constitutional issues, including that of 
due process, are questions of law which ap-
pellate court reviews for correctness. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>641.4(2) 
In criminal context, waiver of counsel 
must be shown to have been made knowing-
ly, intelligently, and voluntarily. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
4. Criminal Law <°>641.7(1) 
Preferred method of ascertaining waiver 
of right to counsel in criminal proceedings is 
colloquy on the record between trial court 
and defendant, and absent this colloquy, valid 
waiver may be demonstrated if the record 
reflects penetrating questioning by trial 
court to determine that defendant is aware of 
nature of charges, statutory offenses includ-
ed within them, range of allowable punish-
ments thereunder, possible defenses to 
charges and circumstances in mitigation 
thereof, and all other fact essential to broad 
understanding of the whole matter. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
5. Infants <3=>205 
A waiver of statutory right to counsel in 
termination of parental rights proceeding is 
proper as long as record as a whole reflects 
the parent's reasonable understanding of 
proceedings and awareness of right to coun-
sel. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-913(l)(a). 
6. Infants <S=>205 
Trial court's on the record discussion 
with father, coupled with the fact that father 
had been represented by appointed counsel 
since termination of parental rights proceed-
ings were first initiated, indicated that father 
had reasonable understanding of proceedings 
and of his right to counsel when he chose not 
to communicate with his attorney, and, thus, 
father waived his statutory right to counsel. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-913(l)(a). 
